AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The signing of a defence agreement among Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in Mecca appears to go beyond a bilateral or purely symbolic military accord. The reactions expressed by Kanwal Sibal, former Indian diplomat and foreign secretary, and Gönül Tol, researcher and analyst of Turkish affairs, indicate that this agreement can be interpreted from different angles—from an effort to strengthen defence cooperation among the three countries to the formation of a new power arrangement in the Islamic world and West Asia.
Mecca Agreement: More Than a Symbolic Pact
Gönül Tol, in her response to the agreement, has emphasised that although its signing in Mecca on a Friday carries symbolic significance, the content of the pact more closely resembles the institutionalisation of existing defence cooperation among the three countries. In her view, describing this pact as a kind of “Islamic NATO” remains far too ambitious.
Nevertheless, the key point in the agreement is the principle of collective defence—namely, that an attack on any one of the three countries is considered an attack against all three. This very element has given the agreement greater importance compared to many other regional security arrangements.
Tol also recalls that the 2025 Saudi–Pakistan defence agreement likewise contained a form of collective-defence clause, yet an attack on Saudi Arabia did not necessarily trigger an automatic Pakistani military response. From this perspective, the new text can be seen as a step toward strengthening the security commitments of the three countries.
Agreement Should Not Be Downplayed
Kanwal Sibal, however, takes a far more pessimistic view of the agreement. In response to analyses that regard it as merely symbolic or ordinary, he asks: “Which defence pact, apart from NATO, has such a provision?”
Sibal’s argument is that even Article 5 of NATO does not necessarily mean an automatic military response by members in the event of an attack on one of them. In his view, the provisions of the trilateral Mecca agreement may be noteworthy in this regard.
Sibal also compares the agreement with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and believes that Article 9 of that treaty was not as explicit as the new agreement. Therefore, in his opinion, the Mecca agreement cannot simply be dismissed as insignificant through the use of clichéd diplomatic language.
This perspective is rooted in a broader concern: any change in the security architecture of West Asia can directly or indirectly affect India’s interests.
Iran: The Central Variable in the New Equation
One of the most important axes of Sibal’s analysis is the role of Iran. He believes that the new defence agreement cannot be analysed without taking into account Iran’s recent confrontations with the United States and Israel.
From Sibal’s perspective, Iran has demonstrated in the past and in various crises that it possesses the capacity for military response. He also notes that the Gulf Arab countries have not necessarily stood alongside Iran in the Iran–Israel conflicts and that, conversely, concerns exist about the vulnerability of their infrastructure to Iranian retaliation.
In such circumstances, the formation of a security framework among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan can be regarded as part of an effort to create regional deterrence.
Nevertheless, Sibal maintains that this pact does not necessarily create genuine deterrence against Iran. His reasoning is that if Iran has not been deterred by American military power, including its nuclear capacity, it is unlikely to be influenced merely by such a pact.
Is Primary Target of Pact Iran or Israel?
Here one of the most significant differences in the existing narratives takes shape.
Some of the analyses raised in the referenced tweets view this agreement more within the framework of countering the expansion of Israeli influence in the region. In contrast, Sibal explicitly believes that the pact has been shaped primarily in response to the Iranian threat.
Sibal responded to analyses that regard this pact mainly as an effort to contain Israeli expansion and to counter Iranian threats in Yemen. He recalled that Iran itself has militarily responded to Israel and the United States, that the Gulf countries did not support Iran against Israel, that Israeli aircraft overflew Gulf countries to bomb Iran, and that, according to reports, Saudi Arabia had pressed the United States behind the scenes to decimate Iran. Turkey and Israel are at loggerheads today but have had close cooperation in the past, and Pakistan, while maintaining a posture of hostility, has been reaching out to Israel quietly. Sibal concluded that although India may not be the primary target of this pact, Pakistan would promote the narrative that all regional threats to the three countries fall within its purview. The principal aim of the pact is the threat from Iran.
On the other hand, Gönül Tol emphasises that one should not hastily conclude from this agreement that an “anti-Israel alliance” or an “Islamic NATO” has been formed. In her view, the reality is more complex, and the agreement, more than anything else, formalises and structures the existing defence cooperation among the three countries.
Turkey: Ambition for Leadership of Islamic World
One of the sharpest parts of Kanwal Sibal’s analysis concerns Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkey’s regional policy.
Sibal believes that in recent years Erdoğan has sought to enhance Turkey’s role in West Asia and the Islamic world and to present himself as one of the principal leaders of the Islamic world. In his view, Turkey aims to create another centre of Islamic power alongside Saudi Arabia’s traditional role.
Sibal also accuses Erdoğan of having tried to limit Saudi Arabia’s leadership role in the reform process and the new policies of the Islamic world and, in contrast, of seeking to create a more conservative bloc consisting of Turkey, Pakistan and Malaysia.
From this angle, the Mecca pact is not merely a defence agreement; it can also form part of the competition to determine the political centre of gravity of the Islamic world.
The Issue of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Salman
Sibal believes that Erdoğan’s effort to draw closer to Saudi Arabia and bring it into a political–security framework influenced by Turkey actually conflicts with Mohammed bin Salman’s regional ambitions.
In his view, Saudi Arabia has in recent years sought to make its foreign policy more independent, pragmatic and based on the country’s national interests. Therefore, Riyadh’s entry into a trilateral framework with Turkey and Pakistan can raise questions about the degree of Saudi Arabia’s strategic autonomy.
Why Is India Concerned?
Kanwal Sibal writes about the implications of this agreement for India that, on the face of it, the pact is not necessarily directed against India; yet if Pakistan succeeds in establishing the narrative that regional security threats against all three countries are shared, it is possible that India may in future be placed within the framework of such narratives.
From this perspective, India’s concern is not merely the direct text of the agreement but the narrative that takes shape in its wake.
Sibal even raises the question of whether, if India were to strike one of the terrorist bases in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would regard this as an attack on Pakistan and stand with Pakistan against India. Just as we saw in “Operation Sindoor,” where Pakistan, with the help of China and Turkey, stood against India, and Turkey’s open support for Pakistan in that confrontation is a cause for concern for India.
For this reason, he proposes that India examine its options for cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Greece and Cyprus, and at the same time hold consultations with Iran as well.
Pakistan: An Important Beneficiary of Agreement
Among the three parties to the agreement, Pakistan may have secured one of the most significant strategic gains.
Pakistan, on the one hand, has long-standing and extensive defence relations with Saudi Arabia and, on the other, has in recent years expanded its military and strategic cooperation with Turkey. Therefore, the Mecca agreement can place Pakistan in a position where it plays a linking role between two important powers of the Islamic world—Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Sibal also notes that Turkey has previously provided Pakistan with arms assistance and that Saudi Arabia possesses considerable financial capacity. The combination of these two capacities—Turkey’s industrial and military capability and Saudi Arabia’s financial resources—can be of particular importance for Pakistan.
Is “Islamic NATO” Taking Shape?
A trilateral defence pact, even if it includes collective-defence commitments, is still far removed from the complex structure and the military, political and command institutions of NATO. As Gönül Tol has also pointed out, it is better at this stage to view the agreement primarily as the institutionalisation of defence cooperation among the three countries.
On the other hand, underestimating it can also be a mistake. The principal importance of the Mecca agreement may lie not in the fact that it has already created a military alliance similar to NATO, but in the fact that it has established a new framework for security cooperation among three important countries of the Islamic world. If this framework expands in the future or if other countries draw closer to it, then one may speak of the emergence of a new security architecture in the Islamic world.
Therefore, at present such a description should be used with caution; yet time will tell—perhaps in the future this agreement will serve as the foundation for an Islamic NATO.
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